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Health and Safety Code §§ 39910, 39915, 39920, 42301.15,
42314.3 (new); Public Resources Code §§ 25519.5, 25550.5
(new), 25514, 25521, 25523, 25531, 25552 (amended); Public
Utilities Code §§ 353.1, 353.3, 353.5, 353.7, 353.9, 353.11,
353.13, 353.15 (new).
SBx1 28 (Sher); 2001 STAT. Ch. 12.
I. INTRODUCTION
During only one episode of The Tonight Show, Jay Leno saved enough
electricity to light a four-bedroom house for a month.' One of Leno's guests that
night, Governor Gray Davis, jokingly suggested a different way to keep
California lit: "I get a really long extension cord and I plug it into a socket in
Texas. 2 Elsewhere in California, disgruntled consumers were not laughing.'
During the summer of 2000, consumers spent $10.9 billion more for electricity
than they did the previous summer. Today, the State's three largest utilities,
Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and
Electric find themselves in no less serious a situation.5
California's electric power dilemma can be traced back to deregulation: the
transition from public to private control of electricity.6 In 1996, there was a
consensus among lawmakers that deregulation of the electricity industry was
1. See Patricia Porter, Gray and Jay Meet on the Dark Side, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 22, 2001, at A2
(describing the special "unplugged" edition of the program which included a discussion about Davis'
conservation program and poke fun at the energy crisis in general).
2. Id.
3. See David Lazarus, Energy: Summer Ushered in a Power Crisis that Promises Only to Get Worse,
S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 2000, at D1 (describing consumer discontent in the San Diego area). But see Toni
Vranjes, Power Play, CAL. L. BUS., July 30, 2001, at 10 (suggesting that energy lawyers are probably laughing
all the way to the bank).
4. Nancy Vogel, How State's Consumers Lost with Electricity Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000,
at Al.
5. See Tim Reiterman et al., PG&E Declares Bankruptcy; State's Crisis Plans Collapse, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2001, at Al (describing PG&E's chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of $18 billion-$8.9 billion of which is
due to the energy crisis-as the third.-largest in U.S. history).
6. See Christian Berthelsen, Genesis Of State's Energy Fiasco: String of Bad Decisions on Deregulation
Could End Up Costing Consumers $40 Billion, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 31, 2000, at AI (describing the events that
led up to deregulation and the crushing effect it has had on California energy).
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necessary. Today, most lawmakers agree that deregulation was a colossal
failure.8 However, the State's energy problems have less to do with increased
usage than they do with high wholesale electricity costs. 9 Governor Gray Davis
solicited help from the federal government,'0  but the Bush administration
indicated a general unwillingness to get involved with California's energy
nightmare." In an effort to ease California out of its power crisis, Davis stressed
the need for a dramatic increase in energy conservation and generation. Chapter
12 is representative of lawmakers' efforts to make more energy available in
California." One way to increase generation is by shortening the amount of time
spent approving electricity generation facilities. 4 Authored by Senator Byron
Sher, Chapter 12 is expected to hasten the power plant certification process
without jeopardizing the environment."
7. See Richard Nemec, Electricity in California: A Political and Economic Crossroads, CAL. J., Jan.
2001, at 12 (describing the unanimous passage of the "anointed" Assembly Bill 1890); Berthelsen, supra note 6,
at Al (suggesting that successful deregulation of the airlines and long-distance telephone service providers
caused, in the words of former utility securities analyst Eugene Coyle, "blind adherence to free-market
ideology").
8. See Berthelsen, supra note 6, at Al (arguing that the Assembly and the Senate approved AB 1890
hastily and without fully understanding its details); Michael A. Yuffee, California's Electricity Crisis: How
Best to Respond to the "Perfect Storm," 22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 67 (2001) (explaining that the deregulation bill
was unsound because it was enacted on a foundation of inadequate and old generation facilities).
9. See Christian Berthelsen & Scott Winokur, Soaring Electric Use More Fiction Than Fact: Chronicle
Investigation Finds Power Companies Manipulate Data to Excuse Their Towering Rates, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
11, 2001, at Al (explaining that one cannot legitimately blame consumers because the 4.75 percent increase in
electricity consumption from 1999 to 2000 was not too much for power companies to handle); SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA EDISON, CALIFORNIA ENERGY CRISIS OVERVIEW, http://www.sce.com/005-regulinfo/
005c6aoverview.shtml (last visited June 28, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating
that "the total wholesale cost for electricity in California was twenty-eight billion dollars in 2000, compared to
seven billion dollars in 1999").
10. See Davis Requests Meeting with Bush, MEGAWATr DAILY, May 24, 2001, at 1 (describing Davis'
efforts to get President Bush to agree to price caps).
11. See Zachary Coile, Cheney Blames Davis for Crisis: They Knew Over a Year Ago They Had a
Problem, S.F. CHRON., May 21, 2001, at Al (describing a political "blame game" between California and the
federal government wherein Vice President Dick Cheney called Davis' efforts to remedy the situation by using
the State to purchase power a "harebrained scheme"). But see Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Nancy Vogel,
Regulators OK Price Limits on Power in West Energy: Federal Panel Closes Loophole in Imposing Curbs Full
Time, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2001, at Al (describing FERC order which placed price caps on wholesale
electricity).
12. See generally Exec. Order Nos. D-15-00, D-18-01, D-19-01, D-39-01 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (conservation); Exec. Order Nos. D-24-01, D-25-01, D-26-01, D-27-01, D-28-01 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (generation).
13. See Ric Teague, Davis Signs Bill to Speed Power Plant Approval, ENERGY ONLINE DAILY NEWS,
May 23, 2001, at http://www.energyonline.comlnews/articles/e23-1ca.asp (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (quoting Governor Davis as saying "the best long-term weapon is to build more power plants," and this
bill will "set a landspeed record for siting plants").
14. SENATE FLOOR, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF SBxl 28, at 5 (May 10, 2001).
15. See id. at 4; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25001 (West 1996) (stating that it is California's policy to
maintain electricity supply); see also id. § 800 (West 1996) (stating that it is California's policy to account for
environmental impact of power plant siting); R.H. BALL, ET AL., CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY QUANDRY: II.
PLANNING FOR POWER PLANT SITING, at v (1972) (explaining that, while power companies want to avoid a
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II. BACKGROUND
The electricity industry breaks down into three components: generation,
transmission, and distribution. 6 In the United States, electricity is generated
primarily by burning fossil fuels. 7 Other sources include nuclear power and
renewable fuels, which harness the powers of wind, water, and sun. 8 Since
electricity cannot be stored, generation must constantly keep up with demand.' 9
The California Independent System Operator (ISO) is charged with the
management of transmission of electricity across the network of interconnected
power lines called the power "grid."20 While glitches that result in blackouts are
at times due to insufficient generation, transmission congestion also causes
problems.'
Regulation of the electricity industry began as part of President Roosevelt's
New Deal legislation. At that time, it was logical to regulate electricity because
competition would have required power suppliers to erect their own transmission• 23
lines. From the 1930s to the late 1970s, the United States electric power
industry was successful. 4 Then, as a result of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, the United States got its first exposureS 21
to deregulation. In 1973, OPEC withheld oil from the West as a punishment for
its involvement in the Arab-Israeli War.26 The OPEC crisis piqued America's
power crisis, conservationists are concerned with preventing an environmental crisis). Power plant siting
decisions have notoriously been subject to these conflicting points of view. Id.
16. Michael Evan Stem & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stern, A Critical Overview of the Economic and
Environmental Consequences of the Deregulation of the U.S. Electric Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 79, 84
(1997).
17. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY GENERATION, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/
page/prim2/chapter3.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that
seventy percent of the electricity generated in the United States is the product of fossil fuels like coal,
petroleum, and gas).
18. Id.
19. See CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR, CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY: HOW IT WORKS,
http://www.caiso.com/PowerCentral (last visited Feb. 20, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(referring to this demand as the "load").
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 (West 1997).
23. See Vogel, supra note 4, at Al (suggesting that competition was unheard of because "delivering
electricity is a natural monopoly" once the distribution lines are in place).
24. See Stem & Stern, supra note 16, at 85 (explaining that plants generally kept up with growing
demand, making the system "reliable and efficient").
25. See id. at 86-87 (characterizing the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, which
encouraged both competition and the development of alternative energy sources, as "the first step toward
deregulation").
26. See Richard Mably, The Arab Embargo-From Oil Crisis to OPEC Crisis, MIDDLE E. TIMES, Oct.
18, 1998, available at http://www.metimes.com /issue98-42/methaus.htm (last visited July 24, 2001) (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (comparing the relatively high bargaining power OPEC countries had in
the 1970s with the relatively low bargaining power they have now and suggesting that this is due to the fact that
the United States has increased its own self-sufficiency significantly).
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interest in alternative forms of energy." The United States attempted to lessen
reliance on oil-producing nations by generating its electricity with non-fossil fuel
resources.2 1 California led the nation in this respect; its utilities making long-term
commitments with "green energy" generators. 29 Rates began to climb as
California became dedicated to more expensive, environmentally-friendly
power.3° Then, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the agency
in the Department of Energy that handles natural gas, oil, and electricity issues,
set the stage for deregulation by opening access to transmission lines nationwide,
eliminating the "natural monopoly" phenomenon.3" In the early 1990s,
deregulation looked like the answer to out-of-control prices.32 The belief was, if
power companies could compete in a market environment, prices would drop.33
The passage of Assembly Bill 1890 in 1996 introduced deregulation to
California, but it did not produce the kind of competition which the Legislature
hoped it would.34 When wholesale electricity prices increased, there was nothing
to stop the utilities from passing on costs to consumers.35 No major power plants
were built during the 1990s because power generators were unwilling to invest in
such a heavily regulated and unstable market.36 Furthermore, the Energy
Commission underestimated the economic growth in store for the State. 7
Advocates of deregulation think it was undertaken too cautiously; opponents
27. Stern & Stern, supra note 16, at 86; see Vogel, supra note 4, at Al (explaining that in 1978,
"Congress forced utilities to buy electricity from companies willing to produce it with solar panels, windmills,
farm waste[,] or factory steam.").
28. See Vogel, supra note 4, at Al (discussing how Congress forced utilities to buy energy from
companies who produced it by alternative means).
29. See id. (noting that, by 1994, California produced eighty percent of the total wind and solar energy in
the United States).
30. See id. (illustrating the climbing rates with Southern California Edison estimates: "since 1985
[Edison] has paid twenty-five billion dollars more for electricity under alternative energy contracts than it
would have spent to produce the energy by traditional means").
31. See FERC Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (1996) (describing the "natural monopoly"
phenomenon).
32. See Opensecrets.org, Electricity Deregulation, at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/electricity.
htm#electric4 (updated Jan. 30, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that both the
government and the electricity industry endorsed deregulation); Nemec, supra note 7, at 12 (explaining how the
bill slid through the Senate and the Assembly in a matter of days, facing virtually no opposition).
33. See Lisa Simon & Carol Ann O'Dea, Who Turned Out the Lights? A Look at the California Energy
Crisis, 11 ANDREWS UTIL. INDUSTRY LITIG. REP. 17 (2001) (reasoning that prices did not drop because new
power companies were unable to provide their services at a competitive price, and, in many instances,
customers were unwilling to switch).
34. Id.
35. See Simon & O'Dea, supra note 33 (blaming high electricity prices on deregulation).
36. Yuffee, supra note 8, at 68; see Simon & O'Dea, supra note 33, at 17 (explaining that before
deregulation, the electricity business was less profitable because of California's strict environmental laws, and,
after deregulation, the business was too uncertain because nobody knew exactly how deregulation would affect
the market).
37. See Berthelsen, supra note 6, at Al (noting that, in terms of energy supply, California began falling
behind in 1999).
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worry that the State moved too aggressively.38 Nevertheless, those on both sides
of the issue believe that California needs more power plants.39 Chapter 12
represents a push to get more power plants online in the state by streamlining the
power plant siting process."
III. EXISTING LAW
In 1970, Congress made important amendments to the Clean Air Act.4' Air
pollution was recognized as a serious health threat and Congress wanted a way to
regulate it.42 The Clean Air Act sets uniform national air quality standards, but it
lets the individual states decide how to comply. 43 Each state must devise its own
congressionally approved "state implementation plan" (SIP)." The SIP's can be
as creative as necessary to comply with the federal minimum reduction targets.3
Some polluters in California use what are called "emissions offsets," where one
"power plant developer ... pays other air pollution sources to reduce their
emissions" to meet federal requirements. 6
The Warren-Alquist Act simplified power plant siting (the application and
certification process). 47 The Act gave sole certification authority to the California
Energy Commission (CEC) 48 and required a decision on certification within one
year of application by a utility.4 9 However, the CEC certification process remains
fairly elaborate. Before an application may be filed, the candidate must
38. James C. Benton & Chuck McCutcheon, Electricity Deregulation Supporters, Skeptics Draw
Lessons From California Crisis, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY. 226, 226 (2001).
39. See Press Release, Senator Byron Sher, 11 th District, Governor Signs Sher's Bipartisan Energy
Legislation into Law (May 22, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the Bill as a
"balanced package").
40. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SBx1 28, at 5 (May 10, 2001).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 1995); ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 91 (5th ed. 2000).
42. FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 41, at 90.
43. Id. at 91.
44. Id. at 92.
45. See CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, WELCOME TO THE 1994 CALIFORNIA STATE
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, VOLUME I: OVERVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA OZONE SIP, http://www.arb.ca.gov/sip/
sipvol 1.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that each of the
six nonattainment areas in the State has its own reduction schedule depending on its status as "serious,"
"severe," or "extreme").
46. Peter Asmus, California's New Energy Legacy: A Desperate Innovation, CAL. J., Jan. 2001, at 18.
47. Warren-Alquist Act of 1974, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1996).
48. Id. § 25500.
49. Id. § 25522.
50. See id. §§ 25502-25531 (describing the process, which spans twenty pages of the Public Resource
Code from start to finish and includes a total of fifteen steps); see also California Energy Commission, Power
Plants Greater than 300 MW Presently Under Review, http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/background.html
(last modified May 30, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the process as having
four steps). But see Metcalf Energy Center, California Energy Commission Permit Process,
http://www.metcalfenergycenter.com/facts/permit.asp (last visited June 1, 2001) (copy on file with the
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complete a "notice of intent," which includes a detailed description of the
proposed facility and its location, including at least three alternative sites." Then
the CEC must publish the notice" and make comments and recommendations
regarding the proposed site.53 Next, the CEC must hold informational
presentations and nonadjudicatory hearings.54 The CEC then summarizes the
hearings and distributes transcripts to interested parties.5 Then, the agency must
hold adjudicatory hearings 6 and submit a final report.57 However, in no sense is
this "final" report actually final; more comments, recommendations, and hearings
follow.58 Then, once the CEC approves the notice of intent, an applicant may
finally submit to the CEC an application for consideration. 9 At this point, the
CEC has one year to make its decision. 6° The CEC forwards the application to
local governments who, unlike the CEC, have an unlimited amount of time to
review it.6 1 Of course, the CEC cannot certify an applicant until the public
scrutinizes the published application at a final set of hearings. 6 Finally, the CEC
submits its written decision, which is subject to a very limited appeals process.63
IV. CHAPTER 12
Called a "balanced package," Chapter 12 is an endeavor to expedite electric
power production while maintaining high air quality standards. One of the most
important changes this law makes concerns local jurisdictions' review of
McGeorge Law Review) (describing the process as having six parts: "pre-filing, data adequacy, discovery,
analysis, hearings, decision").
51. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25502, 25504.
52. Id. § 25505.
53. Id. §§ 25506-25506.5.
54. See id. § 25509 (stating that the presentations must be conducted within forty-five days after notice
of intention is filed, which ensures that the public is informed about a particular proposed facility); see also
CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, ENERGY FACILITIES LICENSING PROCESS-GUIDE TO PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION, http://www.energy.ca.gov/siting/guidejlicenseprocess.html (last modified Dec. 11, 2000)
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (referring to power plant licensing as a "public process" and
outlining the various methods of public participation); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25509.5 (indicating that the
purpose of these hearings is "to provide knowledge and understanding of proposed facilities and sites [and] to
obtain the views and comments of the public").
55. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25510.
56. Id. § 25513.
57. Id. § 25514 (West Supp. 2002).
58. Id. §§ 25514.3, 25515 (West 1996).
59. Id. § 25516; see also id. § 25520 (West Supp. 2001) (describing required contents of an application).
60. Id. § 25516.6 (West 1996).
61. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25519(0.
62. Id. §§ 25519(g)-(h), 25521.
63. See id. §§ 25523, 25531(limiting judicial review so that it is conducted "in the same manner as the
decisions of the Public Utilities Commission"); see also SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SBxl 28, at
3 (May 10, 2001) (stating that PUC decisions are subject to review by appellate courts).
64. Sher, supra note 39.
65. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SBx 128, at 4 (May 10, 2001).
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applications under section 25519 of the Public Resources Code. 66 Bottlenecks
will be less likely to occur at this stage of certification because Chapter 12 limits
67a local jurisdiction's review to a maximum of one hundred days after filing.
Chapter 12 gives repowering projects even stricter certification deadlines; under
the new law, such certifications must occur, if at all, within six months following
61the application.
Chapter 12 requires air quality management districts to develop an expedited
permit process.69 The process must include deadlines for retrofitting existing
power plants (with the exception of those which will undergo replacement or
repowering), so that these older facilities comply with the Federal Clean Air
Act.70 Inevitably, California will need to build new electrical generating facilities
in parts of the State that lack air emission offsets.7 Chapter 12 allows districts to
purchase these offsets for power plant owners.72 The new law also allows
developers to begin construction before they obtain all the necessary offsets.73 In
an effort to relieve some of the stress on the grid, Chapter 12 removes those
tariffs that are exclusive to owners of distributed generation (DG) units. So as to
remove any doubt regarding the finality of a CEC siting decision, this new law
provides that judicial review be exclusively under the purview of the California
Supreme Court.75
V. ANALYSIS
Chapter 12 attracts support from a variety of interests because new electric
facilities will not only increase generation but will replace outdated plants which
pose a major threat to air quality.76 Boosting electricity generation is necessary tomaintain the economic health of the state.7' This new law impacts the health of
66. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25519.5 (enacted by Chapter 12).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 25550.5(a) (West 1996); see id. § 25550.5(i) (enacted by Chapter 12) (defining a "repowering
project" as a modification of an existing power plant which "will result in significant and substantial increases
in the efficiency of the production of electricity").
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42314.3 (enacted by Chapter 12).
70. Id. § 39915 (enacted by Chapter 12); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 1995) (giving the responsibility
of air pollution prevention to the states).
71. See Asmus, supra note 46, at 18 (noting that the offsets are in short supply and dwindling).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 353.3-.15 (waiving standby charges imposed on "grid-connected DG
customers"); see also id. § 353.1 (enacted by Chapter 12) (defining distributed generation as on-site facilities
five megawatts or smaller). But see CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, FACTS ABOUT THE AIR RESOURCES
BOARD'S DISTRIBUTED GENERATION CERTIFICATION AND DISTRICT GUIDANCE PROGRAM, http://www.arb.ca.
gov/energy/dg/factsheet.pdf (last modified Jan. 31, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting
that not all DG units are connected to the grid).
75. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25531 (amended by Chapter 12).
76. Yuffee, supra note 8, at 67.
77. Press Release, James L. Brulte, Senate Republican Leader, California State Senate, GOP Proposes
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
California's environment as well.7" Chapter 12 streamlines power plant siting by
shortening deadlines within the certification process without sacrificing public
comment.79 Furthermore, a simplified certification procedure can increase
generation by attracting willing investors into the state. s
The effects of California's power plant siting frenzy are already apparent.
California ISO reported about'2,231 -megawatts of additional generating capacity
by the end of the 2001 summer.8 ' Even though a 3,414 megawatts increase was
expected, the ISO is optimistic that the rest will come online before the year's
end .
However, while Chapter 12 has certainly expedited the certification process,
this will not necessarily result in more "clean power" in California. 3 First, power
companies are apprehensive -(even after getting certified) about constructing
power plants in an environment of such financial uncertainty. ' For example,
emission offsets are hard to come by in California; they make up only ten percent
of the total cost of a new plant.8 5 Chapter 12 may simplify certification, but it
cannot force investment in electricity.s
Second, California's transmission system may not be modem enough to
endure the massive increase in generation that this new law encourages. 7 The
federal government recently made plans to upgrade the State's transmission lines,
but the project could take up to four years to complete. Increased generation
Long Term Solutions to Energy Shortage (Jan. 31, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Simon &
O'Dea, supra note 33, at 17.
78. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SBxl 28, at 4 (May 22, 2001).
79. Letter from Alexander E. Creel, Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs, California
Association of Realtors, to Gray Davis, Governor (May 14, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). But
see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25502-25516.6 (West 1996) (setting out the steps involved in filing a "notice of
intent to apply" which present a formidable barrier even before the application can commence). See generally
Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the New Millennium:
Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263 (explaining the importance of
public comment in a democracy).
80. See Yuffee, supra note 8, at 68 (arguing that California's complex certification procedure has
"discouraged investment").
81. CALIFORNIA ISO, WINTER ASSESSMENT AND SUMMER 2001 POST-SEASON SUMMARY 3, available
at http://www.caiso.com (updated Oct. 8, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 85.
84. See Dan Walters, Record Undercuts Governor's Message on Handling Energy Crisis, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 11, 2001, at A3 (stating that, whether the utilities will have money to buy power and whether Davis
will follow through with his threats to seize plants, are among the worries of power producers).
85. Carrie Peyton & Chris Bowman, More Power, Cleaner Skies, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 5, 2001, at
Al.
86. Walters, supra note 84, at A3.
87. Yuffee, supra note 8, at 86; see Asmus, supra note 46, at 19 (quoting Bill Kucewicz, former Wall
Street Journal editor, whose studies show that investment in transmission lines is dropping and that this trend
must undergo an extreme reversal "in order to maintain system-wide reliability").
88. See Carolyn Lochhead, 13 Plans Submitted to Alleviate Power Transmission Bottleneck, S.F.
CHRON., July 24, 2001, at A10 (discussing Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham's plan to expand Path 15, the
electricity link between Southern and Northern California).
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may be worthless if this growth cannot be supported by the current electricity
infrastructure.89
Third, although usage of DG units can relieve some of the demand on the
grid, it is not always the cleanest form of generation.' Distributed generation is
an appealing alternative to the power shortage because the units are already in
place. 9' Chapter 12 provides an economic incentive for owners of on-site
generators to supply energy to the grid in emergencies.92 However, even if they
are reserved only for periods of peak demand, encouraging DG usage undermines
Chapter 12's commitment to the environment.93
In recent years, the availability and affordability of natural gas needed to
power so many new plants was not always stable.94 Natural gas prices are tied to
the prices of crude oil. 9 If OPEC were to cut production, natural gas prices would
probably rise along with the price of oil.96 During the summer of 2001, OPEC
threatened to cut production. Today, however, demand is so low that a cut in
output seems unlikely. Still, with the deployment of United States troops in the
Middle East, oil prices have become unpredictable.99 Even if the cost of natural
gas itself does not increase, the cost of transporting it into the State makes it an
expensive commodity.0o
89. Yuffee, supra note 8, at 86.
90. See Asmus, supra note 46, at 19-20 (stating that most DG units run on diesel gasoline, a very dirty
method of generation).
91. See Mark B. Lively, Saving California with Distributed Generation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 15,
2001, at I (stating that there are approximately thirty thousand megawatts of distributed generation potential in
California).
92. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 353.3-.15 (enacted by Chapter 12).
93. See Lively, supra note 91, at 20 (explaining that California permits operation of high-pollutant
emergency generators only when the owner can no longer receive power from the grid).
94. Asmus, supra note 46, at 19.
95. See Andy McCue, We've Become Too Dependent on Natural Gas, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside,
CA), July 8, 2001, at GI (explaining that "the fuels are interchangeable in enough cases to cause overlap").
96. See James F. Peltz, OPEC Considers Cutting Production to Boost Prices of Oil: Slowing the Flow
Could Harm Economic Recovery and May Even Backfire, Analysts Say, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at C3
(describing the global consequences that this action could have while expressing uncertainty as to the real
economic effect that a decrease in production by OPEC would have, considering the poor shape of world
economies: supplies are rising as demand remains low).
97. Stanley Reed, Why OPEC Can't Halt the Price Slide, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 8, 2001,




100. See Shortages Unlikely from Southern California Gas Company, L.A. Bus. J., June 11, 2001, at 10
(stating that California imports ninety percent of its natural gas).
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VI. CONCLUSION
California desperately needs new power.' ' Chapter 12 is a step in the right
direction even though, on its own, it does not provide a complete solution to the
energy crisis.12 It seeks to boost electric power but, more importantly, to do so
responsibly.' 3 The long-term success of Chapter 12 is based on a few
assumptions: an upgraded transmission system must be in place, natural gas
needed to power the generation facilities must be accessible, and power
companies must be willing to invest in California's shaky market. '04 However, if
the recent success of Chapter 12 is any indication, this new law should be helpful
in meeting California's electricity demands and environmental protection goals.' 5
101. See David Lazarus, Experts Say Crisis Likely to Stay Around: Little Government Consensus on
Solution, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 2001, at Al (characterizing the shortage as "an acute lack of generating
capacity" that cannot be corrected quickly).
102. See Creel, supra note 79 (praising SB 28x as "the perfect compliment" to other efforts aimed at
bolstering energy supplies).
103. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25001 (West 1996) (expressing the need for clean and efficient
generation facilities).
104. Supra Part V.
105. CALIFORNIA ISO, supra note 81.

